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We investigate quantum games in which the information is asymmetrically distributed among
the players, and find the possibility of the quantum game outperforming its classical counterpart
depends strongly on not only the entanglement, but also the informational asymmetry. What
is more interesting, when the information distribution is asymmetric, the contradictive impact of
the quantum entanglement on the profits is observed, which is not reported in quantum games of
symmetric information.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The field of information and computation has experi-
enced a fundamental innovation since the last decades
of the twentieth century, through the combination with
the theory of quantum physics. The new-born theory
of quantum information and computation opens a broad
field of potential applications [1]. Its recent application
into the theory of games extends the classical game the-
ory [2], which is in fact one of the cornerstones of modern
economics, into the quantum domain. It has shown that
quantum games may have great advantages over their
classical counterparts [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. Many of
the current works focus on games in which the players
has finite number of classical strategies and/or the infor-
mation is symmetrically distributed among the players.
While games with continuous set of strategies and those
of asymmetric information, which represent much real-
istic significance [11], especially in market situations in
economics, are not given much attention. However the
quantization of these games deserves thorough investiga-
tions, and interesting results could be obtained.
The investigations on quantum games might provide
new insights into the field of economics research, as it
does in the field of computation, communication and oth-
ers. There are several reasons that quantizing games that
could be applied in economics may be interesting. First,
market situations could be in their nature regarded as
games, their quantization may be of the same interests
as quantizing games [4]. Second, in any market situation,
information and communication are of most importance.
However, information is — as we live in a quantum world
— legitimate to think of as quantum information, and
communication may also need to think of as quantum
communication (at least in the near future) [1], it there-
fore might be interesting to investigate the quantization
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of market situations as games, and interesting quantum
features might be explored.
In this paper we investigate the quantum form of
a particular game of the market situation known as
the Cournot’s Duopoly [12] of asymmetric information,
based on the previously proposed physical model for
continuous-variable quantum games [6]. In the quan-
tum game of asymmetric information, the “interaction”
between the quantum entanglement and the informa-
tional asymmetry creates interesting properties of the
game. Due to the presence of informational asymme-
try, the quantum entanglement has contradictive effects:
on the one hand it promotes cooperation and potentially
increases the profits, but on the other hand it poten-
tially decreases the profits at the same time. Whether
the quantum game outperforms its classical counterpart
depends strongly on not only the quantum entanglement
but also the informational asymmetry.
II. CLASSICAL COURNOT’S DUOPOLY OF
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
We now briefly recall the classical Cournot’s Duopoly
[12] of asymmetric information. In a simple scenario,
firm 1 and firm 2 simultaneously choose the quantities
(the strategies) q1 and q2, respectively, of a homogeneous
product. Let Q = q1 + q2 be the total quantity, and the
market price be
P (Q) =
{
a−Q , for Q 6 a
0 , for Q > a
. (1)
Denote the unit cost of firm 1 and 2 by c1 and c2 respec-
tively, with cj < a (j = 1, 2). Then the profit for firm j
is
uj (q1, q2) = qj [P (Q)− cj ] , (2)
with j = 1, 2. In the case of asymmetric information, firm
1 does not clearly know what c2 (firm 2’s unit cost) is,
only knows that c2 = cH with probability θ and c2 = cL
2with probability 1− θ (cH > cL). Yet firm 2 knows with
certainty the unit cost of its product (c2) as well as that
of firm 1’s (c1). Let q
∗
2H and q
∗
2L be the quantity of firm
2 when c2 = cH and c2 = cL, respectively, and q
∗
1 be the
quantity of firm 1. If c2 = cH(L), then firm 2 needs to set
q2 = q
∗
2H(L) to maximize its profit
u2H(L) (q
∗
1 , q2) = q2[(a− q∗1 − q2)− cH(L)]. (3)
Firm 1 needs to set q1 = q
∗
1 to maximize its expected
profit
u1 (q1, q
∗
2H , q
∗
2L) = θu1 (q1, q
∗
2H)+(1−θ)u1 (q1, q∗2L) , (4)
where
u1(q1, q2) = q1[(a− q1 − q2)− c1]. (5)
Solving the three optimization problems yields the Bayes-
Nash equilibrium [2]
q∗1 =
2k1 − k2
3
,
q∗2H =
a+ c1 − 2cH
3
+
(1 − θ)∆
6
,
q∗2L =
a+ c1 − 2cL
3
− θ∆
6
, (6)
where
k1 = a− c1,
k2 = a− [θcH + (1 − θ)cL],
∆ = cH − cL. (7)
The special instance with k1 = k2 = k and ∆ = 0 reduces
to the original model of symmetric information, with the
unique Nash equilibrium
q∗1 = q
∗
2 =
k
3
, (8)
and the payoffs being
u1 (q
∗
1 , q
∗
2) = u2 (q
∗
1 , q
∗
2) =
k2
9
. (9)
However this equilibrium fails to be the Pareto optimum
[3], which could easily be found to be
q′1 = q
′
2 =
k
4
, (10)
with
u1(q
′
1, q
′
2) = u2(q
′
1, q
′
2) =
k2
8
. (11)
vac
1
vac
2
J( )g J( )g
D1
i f
y
y y
M
e
a
s
u
r
e
m
e
n
t
D2
d
d
dd
FIG. 1: The quantum structure of the Cournot’s Duopoly.
III. QUANTUM COURNOT’S DUOPOLY OF
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
The quantum structure is given in Fig. 1, which is the
same as presented in Ref. [6]. The necessity to include
continuous-variable quantum systems is that a continu-
ous set of distinguishable states are necessary to repre-
sent all the possible outcomes of classical strategies, due
to the distinguishability of classical strategies. In Fig.
1, |vac〉1 and |vac〉2 are two vacuum states, e.g. of two
single-mode electromagnetic fields respectively belong to
the two firms. Jˆ (γ) and Jˆ (γ)
†
are unitary operators,
which are known to both firms and should be symmetric
with respect to the interchange of the two firms to guar-
antee a fair competition. The initial state of the game
is
|ψi〉 = Jˆ (γ) |vac〉1 |vac〉2 . (12)
Strategic moves of firm j is associated with unitary local
operator Dˆj. The final state of the game is denoted by
|ψf 〉 = Jˆ (γ)† (Dˆ1 ⊗ Dˆ2)Jˆ (γ) |vac〉1 |vac〉2 . (13)
It is straightforward to set the final measurement be
corresponding to the observables Xˆj = (aˆ
†
j+ aˆj)/
√
2 (the
“position” operators) for firm j, where aˆ†j (aˆj) is the cre-
ation (annihilation) operator of firm j’s electromagnetic
field. If the measurement result is x˜j , then the individual
quantity is determined by qj = x˜j , and hence the profit
by
uQj (Dˆ1, Dˆ2) = uj(x˜1, x˜2), (14)
where the superscript “Q” denotes “quantum”. However,
as will be shown in Eq. (18), in the case we considered in
the present paper, the final state of the game |ψf 〉 is a ten-
sor product of two coherent states, respectively belonging
to the two firms. One can not have a deterministic mea-
surement result of Xˆj, since a coherent state is not an
eigenstate of Xˆj. This poses a problem because the quan-
tity qj is affected by uncertainty ∆q
2
j =
1
2 . One possible
method to reduce this uncertainty is to perform appropri-
ate squeezing operation on the final state before the mea-
surement according to Xˆj is carried out. The uncertainty
of the measurement result of Xˆj could be reduced, at the
cost of increasing the uncertainty of the measurement re-
sult of Pˆj . In this paper, we assume the limit case that
3the state is infinitely squeezed, so that the uncertainty
of the measurement result of Xˆj tends to zero. Conse-
quently, given a coherent state exp(−ix˜′jPˆj) |vac〉j, the
final measurement could deterministically yield qj = x˜
′
j
in this limit.
The classical Cournot’s Duopoly can be faithfully rep-
resented when Jˆ (γ) = Jˆ (γ)
†
= I (the identity operator).
The set
Sj = {Dˆj (xj) = exp(−ixjPˆj) | xj ∈ [0,∞)} (15)
is the quantum counterpart of the classical strategic
space, where Pˆj = i(aˆ
†
j − aˆj)/
√
2 (the “momentum” op-
erators). In this paper, we restrict ourselves to the “min-
imal” extension, i.e. we maintain the strategic space
unexpanded (Sj for firm j) while only extend the ini-
tial state |ψi〉 to be entangled. This minimal extension
guarantees that any features of the game not seen in the
classical form could be completely due to the quantum
entanglement. However it is also possible to find a quan-
tum version that includes both the entangled state and
the expanded strategic spaces.
The choice of the entangling operator is not unique.
Even though the requirement that for vanishing entan-
glement the classical game should be reproduced can not
uniquely specify this operator in the case presented in
this paper. However a possible and legitimate one is
Jˆ (γ) = e−γ(aˆ
†
1
aˆ
†
2
−aˆ1aˆ2) = eiγ(Xˆ1Pˆ2+Xˆ2Pˆ1). (16)
The initial state is exactly the two-mode squeezed vac-
uum state
|ψi〉 = exp{−γ(aˆ†1aˆ†2 − aˆ1aˆ2)} |vac〉1 |vac〉2 , (17)
where γ > 0 is known as the squeezing parameter and can
be reasonably regarded as a measure of entanglement.
Detailed calculation reveals that if firm j’s strategy is
Dˆj (xj) = exp(−ixjPˆj), then the final state is
|ψf 〉 =exp{−i(x1 cosh γ + x2 sinh γ)Pˆ1} |vac〉1
⊗ exp{−i(x2 cosh γ + x1 sinh γ)Pˆ2} |vac〉2 . (18)
Hence the quantities read out from the final measurement
are
q1 = x1 cosh γ + x2 sinh γ,
q2 = x2 cosh γ + x1 sinh γ. (19)
The total quantity is Q = q1+ q2 = e
γ (x1 + x2), and the
market price is P = a − eγ (x1 + x2). Therefore profits
are
uQ1 (x1, x2) = (x1 cosh γ + x2 sinh γ) [P − c1] ,
uQ2H(L) (x1, x2) = (x2 cosh γ + x1 sinh γ)
[
P − cH(L)
]
,
(20)
here for convenience we directly denote the strategy by
xj when it is Dˆj (xj).
Let {x∗1, x∗2H , x∗2L} be the Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
Then x2 = x
∗
2H(L) is chosen to maximize u
Q
2H(L)(x
∗
1, x2),
and x1 = x
∗
1 is chosen to maximize θu
Q
1 (x1, x
∗
2H)+(1−θ)
uQ1 (x1, x
∗
2L). Solving the three optimization problem
yields the Bayes-Nash equilibrium [2] and the profits
could also be obtained. For convenience and simplicity,
we further set k1 = k2 = k. Detailed calculation gives
the unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium as
x∗1 =
k cosh γ
1 + 2e2γ
,
x∗2H =
k − (1− θ)∆ + e2γ [k − 2 (1− θ)∆]
2eγ (1 + 2e2γ)
,
x∗2L =
k + θ∆+ e2γ [k + 2θ∆]
2eγ (1 + 2e2γ)
. (21)
In the remaining part of this paper, we would like to
consider an iterative game in which the unit cost of firm
2’s product is determined by the probability known by
firm 1, i.e. cH with probability θ and cL with probability
1 − θ, to avoid the ambiguity and complexity caused by
the specific choice of firm 2’s unit cost in a single game.
The average profits in the iterative game are
u¯1 (γ, s) = θu
Q
1 (x
∗
1, x
∗
2H) + (1− θ) uQ1 (x∗1, x∗2L)
=
k2
8
[
8eγ cosh γ
(3 cosh γ + sinh γ)2
+
(
e−2γ − 1) s
]
,
u¯2 (γ, s) = θu
Q
2H (x
∗
1, x
∗
2H) + (1− θ)uQ2L (x∗1, x∗2L)
= u¯1 (γ, s) +
k2
4
s, (22)
where
s = θ (1− θ) ∆
2
k2
> 0. (23)
The profits are already expressed as functions of γ and
s, and are plotted in Fig. 2.
The notation s defined in Eq. (23) can reasonably
be regarded as the amount of informational asymmetry.
Indeed, s = 0 is attained only when θ = 0, θ = 1, or ∆ =
0, each corresponding to the case where firm 1 has the
perfect information about firm 2’s unit cost, i.e. there is
no asymmetry in the information distribution. However
for fixed θ, s increases as ∆ increases, and for fixed ∆, s
increases as θ approaches 1/2. This means that the more
asymmetrical the information distribution is, the larger
is s. It is in this sense that we regard s as a measure of
the informational asymmetry of the game.
We now investigate how the profits depend on the en-
tanglement and the amount of informational asymmetry.
The derivative of u¯1 and u¯2 with respect to γ is
∂u¯1
∂γ
=
∂u¯2
∂γ
=
e−2γk2
4
[
4eγ
(3 coshγ + sinh γ)3
− s
]
. (24)
Eq. (24) shows that there is a threshold for the amount
of informational asymmetry, sm = 4/27. If s > sm,
∂u¯1
∂γ
=
∂u¯2
∂γ
< 0, (25)
4FIG. 2: The profits in the iterative game with k1 = k2 = k, with respect to tanh(γ) and the amount of informational asymmetry
s (tanh(γ) monotonously maps γ ∈ [0,∞) into tanh(γ) ∈ [0, 1)). u¯1 is at the left and u¯2 at the right.
which means the profits monotonously decrease as γ in-
creases. In this case, the quantum game is definitely
inferior to the classical game. It is also interesting to see
that if s > 1 we can always find that for some value of
γ, u¯1 will be less than zero while u¯2 remains positive. In
this case, lacking information makes firm 1 lose money
in business on average, yet it is beyond firm 1’s means to
get out of it.
In the case that s < sm,
∂u¯1
∂γ
∣∣∣∣
γ=0
=
∂u¯2
∂γ
∣∣∣∣
γ=0
> 0, (26)
the profits increase as γ increases when γ is small. How-
ever we can find γm satisfying
∂u¯1
∂γ
∣∣∣∣
γ=γm
=
∂u¯2
∂γ
∣∣∣∣
γ=γm
= 0, (27)
hence u¯1 and u¯2 simultaneously reach the maximum at
γ = γm. But when γ > γm the profits decrease.
In the limit that γ → +∞, we have
u¯1(γ, s)|γ→+∞ =
k2(1− s)
8
,
u¯2(γ, s)|γ→+∞ =
k2(1 + s)
8
. (28)
While in the classical game γ = 0,
u¯1(0, s) =
k2
9
,
u¯1(0, s) = k
2(
1
9
+
s
4
), (29)
therefore if 1/9 < s < sm, we can find γc > 0 satisfying
u¯1(γc, s) = u¯1(0, s),
u¯2(γc, s) = u¯2(0, s). (30)
Thus we find another threshold for the amount of infor-
mational asymmetry, sc = 1/9 < sm.
For s < sc, u¯1(γ, s)|γ→+∞ > u¯1(0, s) and
u¯2(γ, s)|γ→+∞ > u¯2(0, s), the quantum game is always
superior to the classical game for any γ > 0. For
sc < s < sm, the quantum game is superior to the classi-
cal game for 0 < γ < γc but inferior for γ > γc, and the
profits reach the maximum at γ = γm < γc. While for
s > sm, the quantum game is definitely inferior to the
classical game, and the profits will get worse when the
entanglement increases. To be illustrative, we plot firm
1’s profit (divided by k2) with different settings of s in
Fig. 3, in which all the above intriguing features could
be seen.
In fact the profits in Eq. (22) consist of two parts:
one is independent of s, the other is linear with s. The
first part is an increasing function of γ while the sec-
ond is a decreasing one. The combination of these two
FIG. 3: The u¯1/k
2 versus tanh(γ) plot with k1 = k2 = k. The
solid lines are associated with the values of s. The horizontal
dashed line at u¯1/k
2 = 1/9 represents the classical profit.
5parts creates the intriguing features as mentioned above.
However it also implies that the quantum entanglement
has contradictive effects on the game with asymmetric
information: on the one hand it potentially increases the
profits but on the other hand it potentially decreases it.
The part independent of s in Eq. (22) can be regarded as
the representation of cooperation. As the entanglement
increases, the cooperation increases and the profits po-
tentially increases. While the part dependent of s in Eq.
(22) represents the impact of the informational asymme-
try. This impact will decrease the payoff with the pres-
ence of entanglement, not only for the player who lacks
information but also for the one who possesses more in-
formation.
A special instance is the case with s = 0 (see in Ref.
[6]), in which the classical game turns back to the original
one of symmetric information proposed by Cournot [12].
While in the maximally entangled limit with γ → +∞,
we have u¯1(γ, 0)|γ→+∞ = u¯2(γ, 0)|γ→+∞ → k2/8, which
is exactly the Pareto optimum. In this case the initial
state tends towards the singular limit
∫ |x,−x〉dx. It is
this limiting state, first considered by Einstein, Podolsky
and Rosen, which enables the two firms to best cooperate,
and therefore to be best rewarded. The dilemma-like
situation is thus completely removed in this limit.
IV. CONCLUSION
We investigated the quantization of a game of a market
situation known as the Cournot’s Duopoly of asymmet-
ric information, based on the continuous-variable model
for quantum games given in Ref. [6]. We found that,
with the presence of informational asymmetry, the quan-
tum entanglement has contradictive effects. On the one
hand the quantum entanglement promotes cooperation
and potentially increases the profits. While on the other
hand, due to the asymmetric distribution of information,
the quantum entanglement induces a decreasing effect
not only to the player who lacks information but also to
the one who possesses more information. The combina-
tion of these two effects results in an intriguing variation
of the game with respect to the measure of entanglement
and the amount of informational asymmetry.
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